Jason Cawley
Wolfram Science Group
Phoenix, AZ USA
Registered: Aug 2003
Posts: 712 |
On Wolfram's own opinions, you can consult the book, specifically two footnotes on page 861 and 1185. "What I do in this book goes significantly further than traditional science in getting rid of notions of purpose from investigations of nature."
Wolfram presents himself as providing explanations for complexity that he regards as rather lacking in previous science. Since he is providing such explanations he is helping the argument that science can explain complex phenomena, obviously. Since he is insisting they are needed, he is implicitly criticizing previous explanations of complexity that were not aware of his own arguments.
Please note that explanation of complexity is a distinct subject, and not to be confused with all of science, or all of biology (it occurs outside biology, too), let alone all of religion (to which it is tangential, intersecting only in some other people's past arguments).
Also please note that reducing the role of natural selection in explaining complexity is not a reduction in the role of natural selection in explaining other things (optimized simplicities e.g.), because complexity is a single distinct phenomena and not the universe. Nor is natural selection, evolution - it is one mechanism within evolutionary theory.
Wolfram wants to trace complexity (specifically) to algorithmic processes that operate even in the absence of natural selection, accounting thereby for its existence e.g. in patterns of fracture or turbulent flow, where there is no question of millions of years of natural selection. The same thing can happen in biology.
In Darwinian terms, it would operate at the "descent with variation" stage, and natural selection might then operate on the (already complicated) results. But natural selection would not have caused the complexity. That would already be there for prior, essentially computational reasons.
Natural selection might then optimize over the space of results, though if the evidence from abstract constraint systems in chapter 7 is indicative (see 342 and following), it might have only limit success in complicated cases. Iterative improvement schemes work well in simple cases and with smooth, continuous fitness terrain. It then explains not complexity, but optimality or successfully satisfying constraints.
Wolfram's argument can explain things like the pattern of innovation and simplification in the Cambrian explosion - an underlying computational "motor" generates variation without needing natural selection time scales to operate, then natural selection winnows the results. Evidence for it can also be seen in populated parameter spaces of biological variation, without any clear selective value (e.g. leaf shapes or shell pigmentation patterns). There we see variety without it needing to have any purpose. That is part of why he sees it as an improvement over continual (sometimes frankly hand-waving) appeals to natural selection alone, as to a supposedly all powerful force.
That is meant to cover what Wolfram actually says both directly on the topic and within the related evolutionary debate (where biologists argue with one another regularly over the role and weight of natural selection compared to other forces - Gould and Dawkins, for example). I will add some comments of my own on the whole ID subject. I worked with Wolfram on the book and specifically on philosophy related questions. But the following are my own opinions, not his.
First there is the intellectual non-respectability of literalism. Nothing can make that work or even help it, it is hopelessly wrong. Being wrong isn't illegal, error is where people start, but this is something we just know is false, and there is no reason to teach things we know are false. To the extent that some pushing ID are just trying to make room for literalism, it is intellectually hopeless.
The more limited claims of ID (rather than literalism) are a philosophic rather than scientific argument, suitable for college philosophy classes not grade school science, that is wrong in interesting ways. (By the standards of philosophy, anyway - anything that reveals something through its refutation meets that standard). In the sense that what it takes as evidence of x is not evidence for x. There are plenty of suitable lessons there about imagined contraries and actual logical entailment, and the like.
There are some points here of philosophical interest more directly related to the NKS way of thinking. For example, noticing the difficulty of distinguishing artifacts due to the complexity potential of entirely natural systems. The correlation "complex" with "artificial" is weak, and in the end unsustainable. We developed the habit of thinking of computation as artificial, but in doing so we have missed an essential NKS point - that nature has been computing all along.
We just discovered the nature of computation recently (I mean in the last 100 years) and did so first in artificial systems designed for it. Now that we know what it is, we can notice it going on around us, in natural systems as well. NKS tells us that universal computation was not invented by Alan Turing, but can occur in a turbulent fluid - it was discovered not invented. After Turing but before NKS, we might have thought only artificial systems would be universal computers, but now we expect to find them everywhere.
I also note that ID people may have noticed weaknesses in arguments of their opponents without it reflecting strengths in their own. As the adage has it, a cat can look at a king. Examples are the difficulty of satisfying complicated (rather than simple) constraints by iterative improvement. Which is evidence for straight algorithmic origins of complexity rather than evolved-to-satisfy constraints origins of complexity (where it happens it is really complexity, rather than optimization, that needs to be explained. In other contexts, optimization may be the real issue and natural selection a main driver).
Then at a purely philosophical level, there is the bare idea of creation of universes. This is distinct from ID; it is, for example, not a claim about evidence. This is an entirely allowable philosophic speculation. The traditional form of the problem asks whether or not the visible universe has an origin in time. Cosmologists, philosophers, and theologians are all welcome to ask what any of a variety of answers to that question might suggest. Perhaps surprisingly, the subject is distinguishable from theism. Either (creation, theism) may be maintained without the other. You can have creation of universes naturally or artificially, artificially by things "less than God". You can also have theism with a static, uncreated, eternal universe (Aristotle did).
Then there is the issue of theism as a philosophical or theological position, distinct from anything having to do with creation, or artificial creation, or design, or claims about evidence. None of which are necessary to that position, though some popular varieties of it may include some of them and dispense with others. It is a venerable topic in theology and philosophy. It isn't science, but anybody is free to have their own opinions about it either way, in the absence of evidence. On its own, it doesn't hurt anybody.
One man's opinions...
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